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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 L-04 DODE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 H-02 SS-20

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P 091827Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6275
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
USNATO 1151
USCINCEUR
THIRD AF SOUTH RUISLIP
USNAVEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LONDON 1856

FOR PM RE PINCUS-PAUL TRIP

1. PINCUS AND PAUL ARRIVED LONDON AFTERNOON TUESDAY 3 MARCH, DEPARTED SUNDAY MORNING 8 MARCH. TUESDAY AFTERNOON THEY MET WITH AMB AND EMBASSY STAFF AND LUNCHEON WITH AMBASSADOR ET AL ON WEDNESDAY. THEY WERE BRIEFED BY ADM WENDT AND NAVEUR STAFF WEDNESDAY MORNING. WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON PINCUS ATTENDED OPENING SESSION PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE DEBATE (DETAILS OF DEBATE REPORTED LONDON 1786) WHILE PAUL MET WITH FRANCOIS DUCHENE AT ISS (LONDON 1815). THURSDAY THROUGH SATURDAY WERE SPENT VISITING MILITARY FACILITIES IN UK: HARROGATE, ARMY SUPPLY DEPOT AT BURTONWOOD, THIRD AIR FORCE UNITS, HOLY LOCH SUBMARINE BASE.

2. PRINCIPAL TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WITH EMB WAS "US TROOPS IN EUROPE": THE STRATEGY THAT REQUIRES THEM, NUMBERS, LOCATIONS, COSTS, POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING, EFFECT OF EARLIER REDUCTIONS AND MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION (I.E. DIRECTED BY WASHINGTON IN DETAIL? CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH?), BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD PRESENT STRATEGY AND AMERICAN FORCE LEVELS. THEY WANTED TO KNOW EMBASSY'S VIEW OF HOW IMPORTANT NUMBERS OF TROOPS ARE; WHAT REDUCTIONS, IN THE BRITISH MIND, WOULD CONSTITUTE "SUBSTANTIAL" REDUCTIONS; THE POSSIBILITY FOR SUBSTITUTING QUALITY FOR QUANTITY; WHETHER POSSIBLE US REDUCTIONS WERE BEING DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY WITH THE BRITISH OR IN NATO AND WHETHER ANY NATO COUNTRY COULD

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CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS ON US FORCE LEVELS; WHAT BRITISH REACTION WAS TO PREVIOUS FORCE CUTS (REDCOSTE ETC.). THEY ASKED WHETHER BRITISH UNDERSTOOD "POST-VIETNAM CONTEXT" IN US; WHETHER BRITISH CONSIDER MANSFIELD RESOLUTION "PASSED" OR SIMPLY UNDER DEBATE; WHETHER BRITISH EXPECTED USG TO MATCH ANY SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP; WHETHER BRITISH WOULD "TRADE OFF" PORTION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH USG IN EXCHANGE FOR CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE; WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD COME TO AID OF FRG IN ANY NEW CRISIS; WHAT BRITISH REACTION TO CZECHESLOVAKIA IS.

3. WE GAVE PINCUS AND PAUL EMBASSY "FACT SHEET" (LONDON 1783) OUTLINING NUMBERS, LOCATIONS, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COSTS OF US FORCES IN UK, AND BRITISH DEFENSE EFFORTS. AT THEIR REQUEST WE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED LIST OF PRIMARY US FACILITIES IN UK (LIST WILL BE POUCHED). WE AID THAT, IN BRITISH VIEW, THE ESSENCE OF NATO STRATEGY IS DETERRENCE. IN THIS THE US FORCES IN EUROPE PLAY THE LEADING ROLE. THE BRITS ARE FULLY AWARE OF ARGUMENTS CURRENT IN US AND REALIZE THAT WE MAY REDUCE FORCES IN EUROPE. THEY ACCEPT THAT THE BURDEN-SHARING IS SOMEWHAT INEQUITABLE AND THAT EUROPEANS CAN AND OUGHT TO DO MORE. BUT EUROPEANS ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT REPLACE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF US TROOPS, WERE THE LATTER TO BE WITHDRAWN. EUROPEAN DIVISIONS, IN ANY CASE, ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, THE LATTER RELATE TO THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE FORMER DO NOT. THEY WOULD HOPE WE WOULDN'T REDUCE FORCES, FOR THEY SEE THE PRESENT LEVEL AS BEING "JUST ABOUT RIGHT." THEIR REACTION TO FORCE CUTS WOULD DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON THE MAGNITUDE OF SUCH CUTS, THE EFFECTS ON NATO STRATEGY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT, THE DEGREE OF CONSULTATION THAT HAD PRECEDED REDUCTIONS, AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY WERE MADE. THEY WOULD HOPE THERE WOULD NOT BE MUCH REDUCTION AND ESPECIALLY NOT IN COMBAT UNITS. NO OFFICIAL TALKS WITH THE BRITISH ARE UNDERWAY, BUT OBVIOUSLY THEY READ THE US PAPERS AND KNOW THE DEBATE.

4. THE BRITISH UNDERSTAND VERY WELL THE PRESSURES AND STRAINS ON US CAUSED BY VIETNAM. THEY WOULD THINK, HOWEVER, THAT AS WE PHASE OUT OF VIETNAM THERE WOULD BE LESS NEED TO REDUCE FORCES IN EUROPE. ALSO, THEY BELIEVE THAT WE VIEW AMERICAN INTERESTS, COMMITMENTS AND ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPE AS DIFFERENT FROM VIETNAM; EUROPE IS NOT VIETNAM AND REDUCTIONS IN THE LATTER SHOULD NOT A PRIORI MEAN REDUCTIONS IN THE FORMER.

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5. THE BRITISH ACCEPT THAT THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION REFLECTS THE OPINION OF CERTAIN SENATORS, BUT THEY DO NOT CONSIDER IT AS "PASSED." INDEED, THEY WOULD HOPE IT WOULD NOT COMMAND A MAJORITY OF SENATE OPINION. THEY ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG NATO COMMITMENT AND HIS ASSURANCE WE WOULD NOT REDUCE AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES IN EUROPE THROUGH FY1971.

6. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT MAY, IN THEORY, PERMIT FORCE REDUCTIONS, BUT THIS CAN NOT BE ANSWERED GENERALLY AND MUST BE LOOKED AT ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THIS QUESTION IS MORE PROPERLY PUT TO THE MILITARY AND TO WASHINGTON.

7. THE BRITISH EXPECT US, IF NOT TO MATCH SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILD-UP ITEM BY ITEM, TO AT LEAST MAINTAIN OUR SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY. THEY HAVE NO DOUBTS BUT WHAT WE WILL DO THIS AND BY AND LARGE LEAVE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE TO US DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR OWN NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES. THEY DO NOT EXPECT US TO DEAL WITH SOVIET CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES ALONE; THIS IS THE JOB OF ALL NATO MEMBERS.

8. THE BRITISH REACTED STRONGLY TO THE CZECH CRISIS AND TOOK PRACTICAL MILITARY AS WELL AS POLITICAL STEPS. THEY EARMARKED AN ADDITIONAL 20,000 MEN FOR NATO, ASSIGNED 50 ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT TO RAF GERMANY AND THEY WILL SOON RETURN THE UK SIXTH BRIGADE TO GERMANY. WE WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT THEM TO COME TO THE AID OF GERMANY IN ANY NEW CRISIS. IN FACT, UK-FRG RELATIONS ARE VERY CLOSE INDEED.

9. THE BRITISH WATCH US FORCE LEVELS CLOSELY. THEY WERE NOT CONSULTED ON PRIOR FORCE CUTS, FOR THESE BY AND LARGE WERE REDUCTIONS IN SUPPORT TROOPS. THEY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED, HOWEVER, DETAILED BRIEFING ON THE EXTENT OF THE REDUCTIONS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6276
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THIRD AIR FORCE SOUTH RUISLIP
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 LONDON 1856

10. PINCUS AND PAUL ASKED ABOUT BRITISH DEFENSE EFFORT AND TRENDS, AND WE NOTED THAT BOTH BUDGET AND MANPOWER LEVELS WERE DOWN SOMEWHAT FROM LAST YEAR AND WOULD GO DOWN FURTHER AS EAST OF SUEZ RUNDOWNS WERE COMPLETED. THEY SAID THEY "HAD HEARD" THAT BRITS TOOK OSTRICH-LIKE VIEW OF AIR DEFENSE. WE SAID THAT AD PROBLEM A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT ON CONTRARY BRITS WERE ENERGETICALLY PURSUING TOPIC AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT. WE SUGGESTED THIS BE RAISED WITH CINCEUR/SHAPE. THEY ASKED HOW MANY POLARIS SUBS BRITS HAVE, AND WHERE THEY OPERATE. WE REPLIED THEY HAD FOUR, BUT OPERATIONS UNKNOWN TO US.

11. THEY ASKED ABOUT BRITISH ECONOMY, AND BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD GREECE AND SPAIN. WE RESPONDED WITH WELL-KNOWN VIEWS.

12. EVERYWHERE THEY VISITED THEY WERE GIVEN FORMAL COMMAND BRIEFINGS. THEY WERE INTERESTED IN, AND WERE BRIEFED ON, MISSION, PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS, AND COSTS TO THE EXTENT KNOWN. THEY WERE CONSIDERABLY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH QUESTIONING, A FULL LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AND THE TYPES OF UNITS AND NUMBERS OF PEOPLE SITUATED AT EACH BASE. ALTHOUGH THEY OFTEN ASKED FOR COPIES OF BRIEFINGS, NOWHERE DID THEY ASK FOR COPIES OF AGREEMENTS.

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13. NAVEUR AND HOLY LOCH. AT NAVEUR THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THE SIZE AND MISSION OF THE SIXTH FLEET, AND ITS RELATION TO THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT IN THE MED. ALSO OUR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN ISRAELI CONTINGENCY. ALSO THE EFFECT OF PERSONNEL AND FUNDING REDUCTIONS. NAVY REPLIES WERE ROUTINE. THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE US MIGHT REPLACE THE BRITISH IN THE ARABIAN SEA AREA, AND ALSO THE STATUS OF DIEGO GARCIA. ADM WENDT REFERRED THEM TO WASHINGTON ON BOTH QUESTIONS. AT HOLY LOCH THEY WERE INTERESTED IN US AND UK SSBN PATROL AREAS, SOVIET TRACKING CAPABILITIES, THE INTRODUCTION OF US POSEIDON MISSILES TO HOLY LOCH, SOVIET AGI TRACKING CAPABILITIES, THE VULNERABILITY OF US COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SSBNs, ASW PROTECTION FOR US SSBNs, AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR HOLY LOCH.

14. THIRD AIR FORCE. THEY WERE BRIEFED BY 3RD AF DEPUTY COMMANDER AND STAFF AND VISITED BENTWATERS, LAKENHEATH, AND UPPER HEYFORD. HERE ALSO THEY WERE INTERESTED IN PERSONNEL AND COSTS, AND ASKED MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE DIFFERENT UNITS AT EACH BASE (AND AT THE BASES NOT VISITED). THEY ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT RANGE LOCATIONS AND UTILIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE EFFECT OF WHEELUS SHUT-DOWN AND THE USE OF SPANISH RANGES. THEY ASKED FOR DETAILS OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS BUT WERE REFERRED TO USNATO/CINCEUR. ALSO INTERESTED IN DUAL-BASING CONCEPT, SAC PERSONNEL AND MISSION, F-111 AIRCRAFT (WHEN COMING TO UK, COMPARISON WITH F-100 AND B-52), NATURE AND SIZE OF COMMUNICATIONS UNITS, REDCOSTE IMPACT, DEPENDENTS AND FAMILY HOUSING. THEY ASKED ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF SQUADRONS TO CIGLI AND AVIANO, AND TRIED TO GET DETAILS ON ALERT AIRCRAFT AND QRA ACTIVITIES. WHEN THESE WERE REFUSED THEY WERE QUITE UNHAPPY, AND FELT THEY WERE "GETTING THE RUN-AROUND." THEY REQUESTED EUCOM ESCORT OFFICER TO PASS TO HQ EUCOM REQUEST FOR QRA ALERT SYSTEMS, LOCATIONS, NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT, ROTATIONAL CONCEPTS.

15. COMMENT: QUESTIONS, ON THE WHOLE, HAVE BEEN NEITHER TOO NUMEROUS NOR TOO PERCEPTIVE. THEIR VISIT TO EACH MILITARY INSTALLATION IN UK HAS BEEN REPORTED IN DETAIL TO CINCEUR BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS CONCERNED.
ANNENBERG

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